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The Primacy of Hope 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper raises the question of whether there is anything foundational to hopefulness when 
considering it as a virtue, and uses the Aristotelian distinction between virtue in the “natural sense” 
and virtue in the “strict sense” to make the claim that hopefulness has a primacy to it. While that 
primacy rests on the existence of care and responsiveness of community, those caretakers must 
themselves be possessed of hopefulness, which, at its best will be virtuous. 
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 “[H]opefulness is crucial to ethical improvement,” writes G. Scott Gravlee, in an article 
entitled “Aristotle on Hope”.1  He is one amongst a handful of virtue theorists who discuss hope or 
hopefulness as a virtue while suggesting that there is something fundamental or primary to hope 
amongst the virtues. This is the ground that this paper explores.  For Gravelee, hope “underlies the 
confidence involved in both courage and natural high-mindedness, and it underlies the deliberation 
and self-confidence necessary both to improve one’s circumstances and to cultivate the excellences 
of character.”2  
 Another excellent example of such a suggestion comes from Nancy Snow, who embraces 
Aristotle’s distinction between intellectual and moral virtues in her discussion of hope as an 
intellectual virtue in her chapter in Michael Austin’s anthology on applied virtue ethics.3  
Distinguishing intellectual virtues as those seeking truth from moral virtues—those seeking human 
(and personal) flourishing—Snow writes that  intellectual virtues generally “motivate their possessor 
to form beliefs in ways reliably conducive to the successful attainment of knowledge.”4 “[H]ope 
especially”5 she says, is a “game-changer” when it comes to that motivation.  I read her as implying the 
same thing about hope as a moral virtue—that hope especially motivates hopers to form beliefs 
conducive to opening pathways to personally flourishing.  The impetus for this paper comes from a 
question in Gravlee’s final footnote, and Snow’s adverb.  Gravlee asks:  “ . . . is hopefulness deeper 
than any virtue, a sort of prerequisite or necessary condition for the development of virtue?”6
 In contrast, a comment from a recent anonymous reviewer challenges this suggestion of 
primacy.  The reviewer wrote:  “the necessity of hope/hopefulness for moral progress. . . does not 
seem to be controversial [read: philosophically interesting]. Indeed, it seems intuitively clear that no 
prospect can be rationally pursued unless one takes its realization to be possible and desirable in 
some respect.”  Echoing this reviewer’s comment, Victoria McGeer writes in her 2004 article “The 
Art of Good Hope” that “hope—or hoping—is not an option for us cognitively competent human 
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beings.”7 So, is hope or hopefulness such a given in human cognition that a discussion of its primacy 
is a fool’s errand? Or, are Gravlee and Snow hinting at something philosophically valuable?  After a 
brief sketch of how some forms of hope have the elements of virtue, I will turn to an examination 
of hopefulness in its status as a virtue to unpack the hope to which Gravlee alludes in his footnote, 
and Snow in her adverb.   
 Nussbaum and Virtue 
 But first, I want to borrow some of Martha Nussbaum’s language about virtue.8 In defending 
Aristotle’s approach to virtue acquisition as a non-relativist account useful cross-culturally, 
Nussbaum describes Aristotle’s process as one in which he identifies places (“spheres of [human] 
experience” in Nussbaum’s phrase) where it matters how you act, and then evaluates what he 
believes it means to choose well or act well in that sphere.9 What comes out of that evaluation is an 
understanding of what it means, in Nussbaum’s words, to be “stably disposed to act appropriately” 
in a given sphere. Nussbaum is arguing that all human behavior can be judged as appropriate or 
inappropriate within its own cultural context.10 Where choice is “nonoptional” and somewhat 
“problematic,” as Nussbaum puts it, there you have a subject for ethical deliberation, and the 
potential for a relevant stable disposition to be identifiable.  
 The present project is an attempt to examine whether hope has some primary role to play 
amongst the virtues; not just in some noncontroversial, intuitive sense, but in terms of the role it 
plays in a structural sense in the building of other virtues.  If something is at least somewhat 
problematic, we have to have motivation to pursue a solution. The pursuit of what is appropriate 
behavior in any particular sphere, I want to suggest, involves—at its base—hopefulness that what is 
appropriate matters.  When that hopefulness is seen through the lens of virtue theory, it seems—at 
its best—to have all the makings itself of a virtue. I believe this inquiry exposes a kind of primacy of 
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that virtue in the study of ethics, and the pursuit of justice. I try to explain what I mean in the next 
three sections.   
 Hope[fulness] as a virtue 
 The general view of hope, whether in a deontological or a virtue theory context, entails a 
cognitive state that contains a belief in the possibility (something greater than zero) of some desired 
outcome (on a spectrum from something specific—a wallet’s safe return—to something very 
general—a vague positive future).  “To hope” in any substantive sense cannot simply be a matter of 
a passing wish.  Hope has to be for something worth hoping for (at least to the individual).  It has to 
be a substantive enough state for the desire for the outcome to be a sustained kind of presence.  The 
hoped-for has to be at some distance from the present, then, and the hoping that occurs in its 
direction has to linger. There is an important distinction between an instance of hope (“I hope 
William will cook me breakfast”) and a general state of hopefulness that will be worthy of the status 
of virtue, as discussed below.  Hope has to be a hope for something (specific or vague) that is elusive 
or difficult to attain.  If it comes easily there is no reason for hope. If it is something that will occur 
as a matter of course then it does not require hope (even though we might use that language).  Hope 
can be malicious or malevolent (that the neighbors go bankrupt or that there is bloody violence at 
the hockey game).  It can be about the pst, if the outcome is not yet known. 
  If hope in some of its incarnations can be seen as a virtue, as many have suggested,11 it must 
meet the criteria Aristotle attaches to the term.  So for Aristotle, as we know, a virtue is “a state of 
character” or a disposition which involves “both actions and emotions” with the goal of seeking 
“the mean in all things relative to us.”12 For Nussbaum, this translates into possession of the stable 
disposition to act appropriately in a given sphere.  All virtues, and thus hopefulness if it qualifies as 
virtue, are i) dispositions or character traits that develop over time and that ii) “aim at the good” or 
position us to “act appropriately.” To distinguish instances from dispositions, I will use “hope” 
5 
 
when referring to individual instances of hope, either mental imaginings13 or actions.  Following 
Snow, I use “hopefulness” as the name for the character trait that, at its best, generates individual 
instances of hope identifiable as virtuous. A character trait worthy of the status of virtue must be 
one worth developing insofar as it causes us to act appropriately or, equivalently, aids us in the 
attainment of human flourishing or eudaimonia.  While I cannot attempt any wholesale discussion of 
eudaimonia here, it is part of the goal of this paper to suggest that hopefulness seems to have a 
foundational or primary role to play amongst the virtues, and thus is necessary for the pursuit of 
eudaimonia—if Aristotle is right that human flourishing requires the development of a harmonious set 
of character traits that motivate us to act in ways that benefit ourselves and/or others.  
 Since virtues are character traits that generate individual virtuous acts, the development of, 
for instance, the virtue of generosity positions one for the production of any number of instances of 
appropriate generosity over the course of a life.  Snow describes this as the “architectonic” 
dimension of virtue.14 Having the virtue of hopefulness generates instances of hope as well, but, I 
want to argue, it does something else also.  It gives us the motivation to see that acting appropriately 
(virtuously) matters. As a virtue, hopefulness will have been cultivated over time into a character 
trait that produces individual instances of virtuous hoping—appropriate amounts of hope directed 
toward appropriate outcomes.  Consider the current political climate in which I am writing:  six 
months before what looks at this moment to be the most contentious presidential election in living 
memory.  To be hopeful in a virtuous way at this moment is, at least in part, to have specific 
attitudes or cognitive states that contain belief in the possibility of an outcome that will be 
positive—and thus desired—for the country and the globe, without having confidence or 
expectation that that will be the case.  Thus the desire for and the belief in the possibility that the 
best candidate will be chosen will serve as motivation for any number of actions (including mental 
imaginings): e.g., conversations with undecided friends, attitudes that keep one in good spirits in an 
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absurd political climate, political contributions, actually voting, etc. Pettit (2004) says hopefulness 
allows us to “adopt a strategy” which could generate many different actions or behaviors that would 
serve that hope.15 Adrienne Martin argues that some forms of hope contain a “justificatory 
rationale” which props up our agency.16 Martin develops a dualistic account of hope that she 
believes better encapsulates what hoping is than the “orthodox definition” found regularly in the 
scholarship on hope: a definition that coincides with my starting place; i.e., belief in the possibility 
plus the desire. Martin sees this belief-plus-desire structure, while inadequate for explaining all forms 
of hope she considers, to be the very thing that offers the rationale for hope at times when there are 
very thin possibilities of desirable outcomes.  If one has real hope in the face of, say, a one percent 
chance of survival from cancer, it is because one is resting one’s motivation on that belief-plus-
desire:  using it (the hope) as the justification for one’s being that one percent. She argues that the 
desire in a desired outcome has features that we use as rationales when we hope.17 While I cannot 
take up a full challenge to Martin here (and I am in agreement with and admiring of much that she 
says), I want to suggest that virtue theory does an even better job of catching up many of the 
nuances and complexities that she points out. If one possesses the virtue of hopefulness, that virtue 
will be there to rely on in situations such as those Martin describes. In her example of Alan and 
Bess, the cancer patients, she describes Alan as saying he hopes the drug works but “he rarely 
appeals to his hope as a justification” for any of his actions or imaginings. I would say this more 
closely approximates “wishing” than hoping.  It does not meet the criteria for virtuous hope, 
certainly.  Bess, on the other hand, sees the one percent chance of survival as a reason to go on.  She 
uses that one percent as motivation for her actions and strategies.18 I would describe Bess as 
possessed of the virtue of hopefulness, which in this arena helps her to generate strategies that, 
amongst other things, keep her spirits up. 
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 For hopefulness to be virtuous, it has to be “appropriate,” i.e., the mean between extremes 
within a particular cultural context and relative to the individual. Too much hopefulness would 
suggest, e.g., the naïve assumption that everything will work out fine, or is “meant to be”—a phrase 
based in unjustified assumptions about, perhaps, supernaturally predetermined outcomes. Such a 
position perpetuates complacency and sets one up for vast disappointment down the road. Too little 
hopefulness would lead to paralysis or despair. Thus, in agreement with Snow, Barbro Fröding 
(2012), Gravlee, and others, hopefulness as a positive disposition or character trait fits the definition 
of a virtue—a trait that aims at the goal of “acting appropriately”, at promoting the well-being of self 
or others—as that which “makes a [hu]man good and which makes [one] do [one’s] own work 
well.”19 
 Natural vs. Strict Virtue 
 Aristotle’s distinction between intellectual and moral virtues helps in understanding the 
territory hopefulness encompasses. If intellectual virtues aim us towards the true, and moral virtues 
aim us towards personal flourishing, it is because of the work that goes into their development.  I 
want to borrow another important piece from Aristotle to think through my current goal: his 
distinction between “natural” virtue and virtue “in the strict” or “full” sense,20 as Fröding reminds 
us.21 As regards moral virtues, someone with natural virtue has acquired a disposition to be more or 
less stably disposed to act appropriately in a given sphere but has not deliberated about the worth of 
this disposition. One might be generally slow to anger by temperament, for instance. Truthfulness 
may be a natural virtue if one’s community molds one—via, perhaps, rewards and punishments—to 
develop such a trait, and if one unreflectively conforms to that molding. Possession of a brightness 
or optimism about the future may be a natural tendency for those who have infrequently been 
disappointed. Hopefulness as a natural virtue may be seen in the naivety or idealism of youth. To be 
virtuous in the strict sense, we need to practice and be practiced in deliberating about what makes 
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for the most appropriate actions in given circumstances.  This is what Nussbaum says all cultures 
do—consciously or not. This kind of deliberation (i.e., what Aristotle calls phronesis) is work which 
must be done by the individual for themselves in order for that individual to come to a depth of 
understanding about why the virtue is a benefit.22  Because, as Aristotle requires, being virtuous 
entails acting “to[wards] the right person, to the right extent, and at the right time, for the right reason, 
and in the right way,”23 but the individual does not work in isolation.  Arriving at a depth of 
understanding of those right reasons may, in fact, require a public dialogue.  One must be willing 
and accustomed to exposing one’s own thinking to others’ examination to ensure one’s thinking is 
clear.  As J.S. Mill would have it, public dialogue is necessary because we gain a “clearer perception 
and livelier impression of truth” when our errors collide with better thinking.24 We have to be 
interested in, respectful of, and authentically engaged with others’ points of view. We have to be 
comfortable bringing our own ethical presumptions out in the open, allowing scrutiny; and we have 
to be in a community that encourages that sort of process.  We do not need to conclude that all 
deliberation has been accomplished in order to be justified in believing that we have a reasonable 
and appropriate depth of understanding.  To be virtuous in the strict sense is to have an 
understanding of what’s appropriate that comes with deliberation and experience; nurtured within a 
community that values that process and the resulting dispositions.   
 Nussbaum, acknowledging a debt to Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium,” writes: “justification is 
achieved not by individuals acting alone but by debate amongst Socratically deliberating 
individuals.”25 Michael Sandel talks in these terms as well.  Character development, in his view, 
should be “a public, not merely private concern.”26 As regards the development of the virtue of 
hopefulness in this strict sense, then, I must be able to articulate what is good about the possession 
of the trait.  I attempt to do this in the next section. 
 Hopefulness as necessary and primary 
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  … as necessary 
 It seems to be the case that developing the disposition of hopefulness specifically is 
necessary for the moral deliberation that builds virtues in general into virtues in the strict sense, and 
thus hopefulness has a kind of primacy in this process not seen in other virtues.  Gravlee asserts that 
hope is crucial for ethical development.27 McGeer also sees hopefulness as crucial to human agency 
generally. Ethical development requires ethical deliberation—and hopefulness is crucial for both.  
Without some degree of confidence in the future we cannot meaningfully commit to any task.  I 
must believe that there is some possibility that the future I am imagining can come about. And, this 
seems to have to come before having the courage of my convictions or using wisdom to find the 
right path. Yet I do not need to be imagining a very clear future.  Consider Jonathan Lear’s 
presentation of Plenty Coups’ “radical hope.”28 Plenty Coups cannot imagine the future:  he cannot 
imagine what his people will be when they have been displaced from the land and the way of life 
that made them who they are. Yet he has hopefulness about the future. I do not need to consider 
the desired outcome particularly likely either:  Martin’s cancer patients or a member of the Black 
Lives Matter movement. Still, coming to a depth of understanding that belief of this sort is the right 
attitude to hold gives one the rational basis for a hopefulness built into one’s personality but does 
not require that each individual action arising from that disposition be reasoned through.  This is 
just what virtue is:  having the character trait that triggers appropriate actions without the need for 
deliberation in each instance. At the same time, the instances (acts or imaginings) of hope that 
emanate from virtuous hopefulness incorporate a desire for the outcome (future or unknown past) I 
am imagining, and contain a belief that that future is the right future for which to hope. Again, this 
sounds similar to the justificatory rationale Martin posits.29 An emphasis on virtue seems to untangle 
some of what appears problematic for Martin. The groundwork that created the virtue (in the strict 
sense) is where ethical deliberation unfolds, and it is why that deliberation can be poised to 
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transform into moral progress.  The motivation to hope is not explicit in each instance of hope.  
Possession of the virtue has the motivation built in.   
 Virtuous hopefulness—the state that grounds instances of appropriate hope and generates 
strategies—if it is a virtue in the strict sense, has the rationale for the virtue generally worked 
through. There is reason to have general hopefulness embedded in your personality: it motivates 
actions and strategies, it gives one ‘fixity of purpose,”30 it guards against despair, it uplifts or sustains 
one’s spirit. The rationale that the disposition of hopefulness is an appropriate (and even essential) 
trait to possess has a great deal to do with the ethical deliberation it inspires.  Hopefulness precedes 
and produces the commitment to hope in particular instances.  Gravlee writes, “`[w]ithout good 
hope or confidence in either the circumstances or in oneself and the worth of one’s actions, 
deliberation and striving concerning self-improvement will cease—for hopefulness underlies 
deliberation . . .”31 So, if I possess the trait of hopefulness, it will come automatically to me that I 
could be the one percent cancer survivor or that demonstrating in the streets is not an exercise in 
futility.  An equally justifiable hope would be for a dignified death or a truly sustainable energy 
source. The rational justification is available to me if I spend time reflecting on what my hopeful 
disposition means for me, but I do not need to produce that rationale in the moment because my 
hope is emanating from a character trait I already possess. 
  … as primary 
 In Snow’s work on hope as an intellectual virtue, she briefly discusses hope’s relevance as a 
moral virtue. Summarizing Roberts and Wood who note that “moral virtues have intellectual 
dimensions and intellectual virtues have moral dimensions,”32 Snow offers an example where 
hopefulness as an intellectual virtue motivates a researcher with a confidence (i.e., hopefulness) that 
the truth she seeks will be attainable;33 hopefulness as a moral virtue gives this researcher the 
motivation to believe that attaining knowledge is a path to personal flourishing. In general, the 
11 
 
virtues appear to work this way.  Hopefulness is obviously not unique in having a presence in both 
categories.  One can have perseverance or courage, for instance, in the pursuit of truth and in the 
pursuit of personal flourishing.  But does hopefulness have a special significance in those categories?  
Is hope especially important? I will focus on the moral virtues side of the question.   
 If a virtue is just the sort of thing from which individual virtuous actions emanate, then, if 
we are possessed of the disposition to ‘x’, at the appropriate time and place we will ‘x’ because of 
that disposition—without deliberating, without thinking—barring significant countervailing forces. 
If one has the virtue of honesty, the motivation for truth-telling is built into one’s disposition  The 
potential for lying is very small, or even non-existent. One will not be directly motivated to tell the 
truth—one will simply automatically tell the truth, even when it is inconvenient.  The action will be 
sparked by the circumstance, which will have triggered the disposition. No cognitive work needs to 
be done in that moment. Moral virtues, acquired through repetition of the relevant virtuous actions, 
are character traits by which people automatically act in the right way.  We can talk about the motivation 
to act virtuously in the moment, but that motivation is not in the moment.  It comes about in a 
much more indirect way. This is where the primacy of hopefulness comes in.  As Aristotle knew, the 
community must be involved in the development of virtues.  It must be actively deliberating about 
what it means to act appropriately in given contexts and examining what are the most appropriate 
virtues to acquire and to pass on. Ideally, children will be encouraged to mimic a variety of beneficial 
attitudes which over time become embedded in an overall virtuous disposition—the natural 
disposition, with several harmonious parts. Within any one child, though, there is one virtue that 
matters more than the others, I want to argue:  the disposition to be hopeful of a desirable future.  I 
want to suggest that this is the hopefulness that seems to be the base for ethical deliberation, and at 
this stage—where the community has instilled the habit (for the child unreflectively)—it is at the 
level of a natural virtue.  If hopefulness is crucial for ethical deliberation, and if ethical deliberation 
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(or phronesis) is what is necessary to develop virtue in the strict sense, then it appears as though 
hopefulness as a virtue in the strict sense must have originated in another kind of hopefulness—
hopefulness as a natural virtue—I believe this is the “noncontroversial” hope my anonymous 
reviewer referenced. If we haven’t been nurtured well by our communities, this disposition may not 
develop.  I take this up in the next section.  For now, I want to note that this leads, at first glance 
then, to the presumption that it is not hope that is at the foundation—it must be care.  But there is 
another layer at play here, rather obviously.  
 The care of the child, which will include modeling appropriate behavior and encouraging 
particular behaviors in the child that creates the natural virtue would not occur unless the caretaker 
were hopeful that the caring will matter.  And I do not think it matters whether the carer has 
hopefulness in the strict sense or merely in the natural sense. While, to develop natural virtue the 
child must be cared for, it is my claim that that care is itself motivated by a hopefulness. The 
community creates the potential for the disposition to develop; their responsiveness to the child is 
grounded in the hope that it matters.   
 I can of course imagine despairing caretakers in, say, a post-apocalyptic world, who have no 
hope for the future but do not want their children to know how dismal things really are.  They 
pretend hopefulness so that the children will have positive outlooks.  This set of circumstances 
could also produce the natural virtue of hopefulness in the children as the children will mimic the 
adults’ artificial hopefulness. The need to be responsive to the child motivates the deception.  This is 
still a hopefulness of a kind; e.g., “[b]y deceiving, I hope to make this childhood less painful.” But, 
hopefulness as virtue in the strict sense would likely be out of reach to those children as they mature 
because public deliberation would later expose the realities.  
 Children and Hope 
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 It is certainly true that “no prospect can be rationally pursued unless one takes its realization 
to be possible and desirable.”34 But this is something that we have to learn; that we have to acquire.  
And, sadly, it is also true that many of us do not get that opportunity.  There are several ways of 
looking at the acquisition of character traits in developmental psychology, but I am going to use the 
literature on trauma to connect my argument to issues of social justice. The California Alliance for 
the Mentally Ill estimates that there are over 20 million children in the U.S. suffering from PTSD 
because of their exposure to the trauma of natural disasters or, more commonly, psycho-social 
trauma.35 Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Tornado Alley annually are examples of the former. 
Physical or sexual abuse, homelessness, the stress of living in a violence-torn neighborhood can all 
affect the way a child’s brain develops.  The D.C. Children’s Law Center summarizes the problem:   
Early childhood exposure to trauma . . . changes the way the brain develops. This change can 
result in major problems with the child’s executive functioning and self-regulation – causing 
a traumatized child to overreact in a situation that seems ordinary to others. Trauma also can 
affect children’s language development, inhibit their academic achievement and make it 
difficult to form relationships with both peers and adults. Traumatized children may develop 
hypervigilance, emotional withdrawal or dissociation, and spend the school day focusing 
solely on their safety – making it impossible to learn.36 
Such conditions make it impossible to deliberate, making it impossible to develop any virtue in the 
strict sense, making it impossible to make moral or intellectual progress. Such conditions make it 
impossible to develop any of the virtues in the strict sense because, I want to argue, at its most 
primary, hopefulness as a disposition has no possibility of gaining a toehold. 
 Those who are most resilient in the face of such trauma, the research shows—no surprise—
are those with intact and available emotionally healthy adult care-givers. Lenore Terr did 
groundbreaking work in this area.37 McGeer notes this as well.38 Living in poverty makes one 
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especially vulnerable to these traumas. It becomes a community or a societal failing, then, often, if 
children cannot make moral progress. Hopefulness is crucial for ethical development. Poverty, 
amongst many other things, can dash such hope. If we are instilled with hopefulness as a 
disposition, it will be early in our development, led by our caretakers and other concerned members 
of our community.  It is out of hopefulness that the other virtues come—in the strict sense. 
Endowing our children with the natural virtue of hopefulness, I am arguing, is what is crucial to 
them maturing into ethical deliberators later, who can take on the project of developing into 
virtuous beings in the strict sense. 
 McGeer and Agency 
 With attention to the psychological literature, McGeer offers an interesting discussion of the 
development of agency, as assisted by parents or other care-givers, and she draws attention to the 
deeply social nature of hope as it is intertwined with agency.39 This is relevant to my thesis because 
of the question of motivation. Hope (my “hopefulness”) develops in us, she explains, through our 
mimicking of others, through our “internaliz[ing] the idealizing work of others.”40  Here, this 
mimicking is about our own potential.41 We mimic—when caring is at its best—because we are 
given the message that we are on our way to our adult potential. “According to hope theory as 
articulated by psychologists,” McGeer writes, “hope is a cognitive activity that involves setting 
concrete goals, finding pathways to achieve those goals, and tapping one’s willpower or agency to 
move along pathways to the specified goals.”42 Side by side with virtue theory, this suggests that 
hopefulness develops over time through trial and error into a more and more permanent disposition.  
We are best positioned for the later ethical deliberation we will do as mature adults when 
hopefulness is instilled in brains free from trauma, and nurtured by our community. McGeer writes: 
“the world must be somewhat responsive to keep our capacity to hope alive.”43 We need 
hopefulness as virtue in the natural sense in order to be motivated to seek positive outcomes, in 
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order to make moral progress, in order to develop the virtue of hopefulness in the strict sense.  
What acts we are encouraged to repeat within our community will set the stage for what kind of 
hopers we will become.  So, community matters hugely, as Aristotle understood. 
 In sum, then, for cognitively competent adults:  if hopefulness is necessary for ethical 
deliberation and if ethical deliberation is necessary for moral progress, including, amongst other 
things, the acquisition of the virtue of hopefulness in the strict sense, what seems crucial is that 
hopefulness as a natural virtue be passed to us as children by our community.  And, thus, it seems, if 
we value moral progress and the pursuit of justice, first, we have to ensure that children are cared for 
well, and then, as adults, we are all morally obligated to maintain the virtue of hopefulness—at least 
the natural version.  Better still would be to feel obligated to deliberate about the virtue of 
hopefulness in the public sphere until its value as a virtue in the strict sense is thoroughly embedded 
in the tissues of our culture. 
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